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Appellee files this Brief in response to the issues
raised by Appellant.
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION
Appellee admits jurisdiction of this Court as alleged
by Appellant herein under Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), U.C., 1995, as
an appeal from a final order.

STATEMENT OFISSUES FOR RESPONSE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.
to Appellee.

Whether the Court properly awarded attorney's fees
The Standard of Review is whether there was an

abuse of discretion in the award.
2.

Whether Appellant's income was properly assessed.

The standard of review is whether there was clearly an erroneous
finding of fact.
3.

Whether the Appellee's need for employment and her

continued employment was anticipated at the time of Decree.

The

standard of review is whether there was clearly an erroneous
finding of fact.
4.

Whether there was a substantial change of

circumstances in Appellant's income.

The standard of review is

whether the ruling was an abuse of discretion.

Not only whether

there was substantial change of circumstance but also whether the
circumstances were anticipated by the parties at the time of
Decree of Divorce.

s:\mbf\64993
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5.

Whether part of Appellant's wife's income was

properly considered as part of Appellant's income.

The standard

of review is whether there was a clearly erroneous finding of
fact.
6.

Whether denial of a Motion for New Trial was

supported by the evidence.

The standard of review is whether the

petitioner presented any new evidence which would give rise to a
clearly erroneous finding of fact or an abuse of discretion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Issue of attorney's fees:
1.

At the initial hearing Appellee proffered evidence

as to attorney's fees and offered to present evidence under oath.
(Tr. pp. 310 and 548-549.)
2.

Appellant acknowledged the proffer and made no

request for testimony or evidence to be presented.

(Tr. pp. 310,

549 and 562-563 . )
3.

Appellant made no request to cross-examine any

testimony and accepted the proffer as though the same were made
under oath.
4.

(Tr. pp. 310 and 54 9.)
At the hearing on Motion for New Trial, Appellee's

attorney provided testimony and was subject to cross-examination.
(Tr. pp. 568-574.)

s \mbf\64993
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5.

The attorney's fees claimed are reasonable and

Appellant is in need of assistance to pay those fees, and
Appellant is able to meet those expenses.

(Tr. p. 310.)

Issue of Income:
1.

Appellant's income at the time of Decree was

$45,000 per year.
2.

(Tr. pp. 273 and 309.)

Appellant voluntarily terminated his employment

which he had at the time of Decree but he did not adversely
affect his financial position.

(Tr. pp. 310, 456, 486, 487 and

552. )
3.

Appellant accepted employment to be a long haul

driver with his wife.
4.

(Tr. pp. 309 and 457.)

Appellant received a mileage rate of pay and a per

diem allowance.

His wife received a mileage rate of pay for the

same miles and a per diem allowance for the same days.

(Tr. pp.

310 and 469.)
5.

Appellant's income was augmented by his wife's

mileage and per diem allowance which together, on an annualized
basis, is $75,000 per year.

(Tr. p. 554.)

Appellant's own

income is at least $36,000 per year plus an additional amount
allocable to him because of his wife's income as a team driver.
(Tr. pp. 310, 478-479 and 553.)
Issue of Appellee's Employment:

s \mbf\64993
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1.

The parties anticipated that Appellant was

employed or would be employed at the time of Decree in a parttime employment.
2.

(Tr. pp. 273-274, 309, 424, 444 and 458.)

The parties knew that Appellee could not live on

the $3 00 per month alimony which the parties agreed would be
paid.

(Tr. pp. 274, 309 and 552.)
3.

Without the alimony payment, defendant is in

arrears in meeting her expenses every month.
4.

(Tr. p. 440.)

The parties anticipated that Appellee would

continue her employment and could anticipate an increase in
income.

(Tr. pp. 276 and 441.)
Issue of Appellant's Wife's Income:
1.

Appellant's wife receives expense and per diem

allowances in addition to mileage payment for team driving with
Appellant.

(Tr. pp. 275-276.)
2.

Appellant's income is based in part upon his team

driving with his wife.
3.

(Tr. p. 275.)

Appellant and his wife each receive the same

payment for mileage, per diem and expense reimbursement.

(Tr. p.

276. )
4.

Appellant's wife's income is based in part upon

Appellant's experience and expertise.

(Tr. p. 275.)

Issue of Motion for New Trial:

s \mbf\64993
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1.

Appellant neither produced nor alleged any new

evidence in his Motion for New Trial.
2.

(Tr. p. 277.)

The trial court reviewed the existing evidence and

the law based upon the Motion for New Trial and found no grounds
for granting the motion.

(Tr. p. 277.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant has failed to demonstrate a material and
substantial change of circumstances upon which a Modification of
Decree of Divorce could be based.

The determination of income is

based upon Appelant's testimony and there are good and sufficient
grounds for the Findings of Fact made by the Court.

The award of

attorney's fees was based upon proffer which was never challenged
by Appellant and is a proper basis for the award of attorney's
fees to Appellant.
ARGUMENT
I.

Whether The Award of Attorney's Fees Was Based Upon Proper

Evidence.
The proffer of evidence or testimony when accepted by
the opposing party was accepted by the Court as though the same
were given under oath and subject to cross-examination.
310.)

(Tr. p.

In the present case, Appellant accepted the proffer,

waived any right to cross-examination, entered no evidence of his
own and the Court entered its Order based upon that proffer.
(Tr. p. 310.)

s \mbf\64993

5

The Court properly exercised its discretion in awarding
attorney's fees to Appellee making appropriate findings that the
attorney's fees were reasonable, that Appellant had need of
assistance to pay those fees and that Appellant had the ability
to pay the fees awarded.
II.

(Tr. p. 310.)

Whether The Findings As to Appellants Income Are

Appropriate.
Appellant voluntarily changed his employment.

The

voluntary incurring of debt, change of employment or voluntary
decrease in income is not a basis for a finding of substantial
change of circumstances.

AuerJbach v. AuerJbach, 571 P. 2d 1349

(Utah, 1977).
The Court found Appellant's income had not
substantially changed nor had appellant substantially changed his
own standard of living.

Considering the portion of his wife's

income was applicable to him, his income was substantially the
same as in 1990.

Finding that there was not a substantial change

of circumstances, the Court denied the Petition to Modify Decree
of Divorce.
Appellant must demonstrate that Facts are clearly
erroneous by marshalling all evidence supporting the findings and
then demonstrating that the findings are not supported by legally
sufficient evidence.

Campbell

v.

Campbell,

App. 1995); Rules of Civ. Proc. Rule 52(a).

s \mbA64993
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896 P.2d 635 (Utah
Appellant has failed

to demonstrate any facts that would demonstrate that there was a
substantial change of circumstances as to Appellant's income.
III.

Whether The Parties Anticipated Appellee's Employment.
At the time of Hearing for Decree, Appellee was

anticipating employment.

At the time the Decree was entered

Appellee was employed part-time.

The parties knew that she would

have to be employed if she was going to survive.

Alimony of $300

per month as agreed would not sustain Appellee at the lifestyle
she enjoyed during marriage.

Appellee's income has only

increased by a small amount since the time the Decree was entered
and has not reached any level that would indicate a change of
circumstances not anticipated by the parties.
Appeals, in Moore

v.

Moore,

The Court of

872 P.2d 1054 (Utah App. 1994), held

that a former wife's stable income was not a change in
circumstances justifying a modification of alimony where the
parties expected at the time of decree that the wife would
continue to work.
The change of value of property, the acquiring of a
home, assistance from Appellee's children does not alter nor
change the circumstances anticipated by the parties at the Decree
of Divorce.

(Tr. pp. 276-277.)

Appellant would be required to

show a decrease in his own standard of living or an increase in
Appellee's standard of living from that enjoyed during marriage.

s:\mbf\64993
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Wells

v. Wells,

871 P.2d 36 (Utah App. 1994).

Appellant fails to

demonstrate any change in the standard of living of either party.
IV.

Whether Appellee Should Continue To Receive Alimony.
In order for this Court to find a proper basis to

decrease or terminate alimony, the Court must find, first, that
there is a substantial change of circumstances and, second, that
the change of circumstances was not anticipated by the parties at
the time of the Decree of Divorce.
(Utah, 1994); Cox v. Cox,
v. Wells,

Moore

v. Moore,

872 P.2d 1054

877 P.2d 1262 (Utah, 1994); and

871 P.2d 1036 (Utah, 1994); Larsen

v.

Larsen,

Wells

888 P.2d

719 (Utah App. 1994).
It is only after the Court finds a substantial change
of circumstances and that that change was not anticipated at the
time of the decree that the Court may consider the financial
condition and the financial needs of the parties involved.
This Court has held "We will not disturb a trial
court's ruling on alimony as long as the court exercises its
discretion within the bounds and under the standards we have set
and has supported its decision with adequate findings and
conclusions."
(quoting Naranjo

Bell
v.

v.

Bell,

Naranjo,

810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991)
75 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988) .

The same standard for review as to an award of attorney's fees
was approved in Udy v.
V.

Udy,

893 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1995) .

Whether Appellants Wife's Income Was Properly Considered.

s \mbA64993
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The Court found that appellant's wife's income as a
team long-haul driver with him was at least in part based upon
Appellant's experience and expertise.
In addition, the Court found that payment of expenses
and per diem were in part income to Appellant.
The facts being clearly substantiated, the Court did
not erroneously apply those facts to the circumstances of
Appellant's income imputing a portion of his wife's income to
Appellant.
QUESTION [to Appellant]:

And is it to

your benefit to have your wife as a team
member as opposed to some third party?
ANSWER:

Yes it is.

QUESTION:

Is it to your financial

benefit for the two of you to keep the truck
going 24 hours a day if you can?
ANSWER:

Yes.

(Tr. pp. 478-479.)
VI.

Whether Appellant Has The Ability To Pay Alimony.
At the time of divorce, Appellant stipulated and agreed

to pay alimony of $3 00 per month.

The Court found that amount to

be very conservative based upon the disparate income of the
parties and well within the ability of Appellant to pay based
upon his annual income of $36,000 plus an amount imparted from
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his wife's income which income together reached a level of
$75,000 per year.
An award of alimony should be reversed only if it
Crompton

represents clear and prejudicial absence of discretion.
v. Crompton,

888 P.2d 686 (Utah App. 1994).
VII.

Award Of Attorney's Fees On Appeal.

Generally, when the trial court awards attorneys' fees
in a divorce action to a party who then prevails on appeal, that
party will also be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees on
appeal.

Utah Code Ann. 1953 30-3-3; Larsen

v.

Larsen,

888 P.2d

719 (Utah App. 1994).
CONCLUSION
Appeal should be dismissed as to every issue and
Appellee should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred as awarded in the proceedings below
DATED this <d?^> day of Getter, 1995.

^ZMZ^7
M. Byron Wisher
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Appellee

s \mbf\64993

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this c* -

day of ^TolBer, 1995,

I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Response Brief of the Appellee, to:
Glen M. Richman, Esq.
Bart J. Johnsen, Esq.
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
60 South 600 East #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

/^/^y^/ET4fr

s:\mbf\64993

11

